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a full "due process" proceeding, it will also have insured that many will never get
on the rolls, or at least that they will remain destitute during the lengthy pro-
ceedings followed to determine initial eligibility."30
Hopefully, this will not happen.
Finally, Chief Justice Burger dissented on the ground that the ma-
jority's decision is an infringement on a legislative function. "I am
baffled as to why we should engage in 'legislating' via constitutional
fiat."''1  The Chief Justice's point is well taken, for in holding not
only that due process requires an evidentiary hearing on the ques-
tion of a recipient's eligibility before any welfare payments may be
stopped, but also specifically detailing what the content of such hear-
ing, the Supreme Court has successfully pre-empted legislative action.
In a rapidly changing area such as welfare administration, why
should the Supreme Court, rather than state legislatures, create rigid
procedural requirements for the varied welfare problems of fifty dif-
ferent states? In so doing the Court comes very close to becoming a
court of legislative revision; a role the Court was thought to have
abandoned in 1937. The result of this is a limiting of state's abili-
ties to experiment with new and creative approaches to the admin-
istration of welfare.
John Henely
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT TO CONSULT WITH
ACCOUNTANT-AN ADDITION TO FIFTH
AMENDMENT LIBERTIES
On January 4, 1965, Special Agent John Trager, accompanied by
a Revenue Agent of the Internal Revenue Service, conducted an inter-
view with Walter Tarlowski at the home-office of his accountant, Michael
Coppins. Trager, before proceeding with the questioning, gave Tarlowski
some of the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona,' includ-
ing the warning of the right to counsel. He then requested and in fact
succeeded in having Coppins leave the room while Tarlowski was being
interrogated. In his interview Tarlowski made several damaging admis-
sions.
In July, 1967, Special Agent Trager again met with Tarlowski, who had
130. 397 U.S. at 278-79 (dissenting opinion).
131. 397 U.S. at 283 (dissenting opinion).
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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by this time changed accountants. By now Trager was contemplating
initiating prosecution, so at this interview he requested that Tarlowski
produce certain books and records. Almost in the same breath, the
Special Agent warned Tarlowski of his rights to silence and to counsel,
while denying his expressed desire to consult with an accountant.
Tarlowski was subsequently tried for tax evasion. At the trial, the de-
fendant, Tarlowski, made a motion to supress the statements and records
thus obtained. His contention was that both interviews from which his
accountant-advisers were excluded violated his rights as guaranteed by the
due process clause of the fifth amendment. 2 The District Court for the
Eastern District of New York agreed. The court held that a representative
of the federal government may not limit an individual's right to demand
the presence of others at an interrogation. Hence, the right to associate
with, and be accompanied by, one in whom confidence and reliance is
reposed is part of the "liberty" guaranteed by the fifth amendment,
which a person may not be deprived of without due process of law.
United States v. Tarlowski, 69-2 USTC 9554 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
Since the 1930's the federal government, with good reason, has ex-
panded until today it engulfs almost every phase of life within its sphere
of influence. This expansion has not been without growing pains, most
noticeably evinced by the reduction of the individual to something less
than that term suggests and something slightly more than a cog in a
gear. Today one is born, numbered, categorized, taxed, fed, judged, re-
tired, and finally laid to rest under some form of governmental guardian-
ship. Concommitant to this reduction, however, has been a distinct rec-
ognition on the part of the judicial system of the necessity of protecting
the integrity of the individual by giving him "a fair shake" when facing
governmental intrusion. The Tarlowski case represents another step
in this direction. The purpose of this casenote, then, is threefold: to
examine the reasoning behind the Tarlowski decision, to review the sources
or direction from whence it came, and to speculate on its possible effects.
Simply stated, this note will examine the continuum in which Tarlowski
must be placed.
Succinctly, Tarlowski posed the issue of whether a representative of the
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation."
576 [Vol. XIX
CASE NOTES
federal government may deprive an individual of the presence of another
at an investigation without depriving him of his liberty under the fifth
amendment. Answering in the negative, the court pursued two lines of
thought: first, what is liberty and how far does it extend, and second,
what due process is necessary to allow a deprivation of this same liberty?
A definition of liberty then, is the cornerstone of this discussion. But
even before attempting to define liberty, it is necessary to take a cursory
glance at the political philosophy against which this definition must be
laid. Broadly speaking, American political philosophy evolved from the
thought of theorists who may be properly called naturalists.3 These men,
Hobbes, Burke, Locke, and others started with the view that man, in
the beginning, existed in a state of nature. In that state all men were
equal and all men had complete freedom.4  Having such freedom, the
only law was that of self-preservation. It is not surprising, therefore, that
the state of nature often became a state of war where notions of right
and wrong, justice and injustice, had no place.5 As a result, man was
forced to seek some sort of peace and solitude and, therefore, he left the
horrendous state of nature and entered society.
How was this departure accomplished? The most common answer
is that men would covenant among themselves to create a sovereign in
whom they vested all power.6 In this manner, man relinquished the
absolute freedom which was his in nature for the conditional liberties
guaranteed by the sovereignr.7 Hence, it would seem that men united
"for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates,"8 and
only so long as the sovereign protected these things would man remain
in society.9
This is the naturalist, or positivist, theory of politics.10  But what
3. BLUHM, THEORIES OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 10 (1965).
4. See HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, PARTS I AND II 104-05 (Schneider ed. 1958), LOCKE,
THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 4 (Peardon ed. 1952); and ROUSSEAU,
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 6-8 (Frankel ed. 1964).
5. See HOBBES, supra note 4, at 105-08; LOCKE, supra note 4, at 8H 21, 123;
ROUSSEAU, supra note 4, at 8-9.
6. See HOBBES, supra note 4, at 112-73; LOCKE, supra note 4, at 8H 21, 123;
RoussEAu, supra note 4, at 14-16.
7. ROUSSEAU, supra note 4, at 19: "Man loses by the social contract his
'natural' liberty, and an unlimited right to all which tempts him, and which he can
obtain; in return he acquires 'civil' liberty."
8. LOCKE, supra note 4, at § 123.
9. LOCKE, supra note 4, at H8 229-32.
10. The positivist theory of politics is based upon a hedonist view of man's
nature, and it is generally opposed by the natural law theory which views man as
inherently good. The natural law theory is often given much lip service but little
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application does it have to present political circumstances? From the fore-
going it should be clear that the sovereign or government is the protector
of all our rights as well as the source. Being the source of what may or may
not be done, the state or sovereign provides the guidelines for what we
define as "liberty." Because these guidelines are never absolute, liberty
is never truly absolute, but may "vary with times and circumstances and
admit of infinite modifications . . . [and] cannot be settled upon any
abstract rule."11 Although we may not with mathematical precision define
liberty, it is "not impossible to discern."' 12  To do this, one must look at
what has and what has not been ruled to be liberty.
To rephrase, liberty is subject to authority; hence, where authority ends,
liberty begins. Further, since liberty is the absence of opposition, it is
when the sovereign or state declares that a certain action is privileged from
opposition that a liberty becomes a right. Liberty, therefore, is merely
the absence of opposition to an act, whereas the rights we so often call
liberties become so only when defined as such. Once a liberty is defined
as a right by the sovereign, it becomes in effect, absolute, subject only to
the reasonable and just power of the sovereign, i.e., government or legis-
lature. As a result, it is by a process of inclusion and exclusion that
liberties become rights. In this manner, the civil liberties which we have
are made enforceable as rights.
If this be the case, then liberty is bound to be only that which is defined
as such in the Constitution, and the argument becomes tautological; for,
if liberty is that which the sovereign says it is, and the sovereign simply
says it is "liberty," we are nowhere. Such is not the case, though, for the
government, or legislature, is not the sole interpreter of the meaning of
liberty. The courts, like the legislature, discern what liberty is-they
draw the guidelines. Therefore, it is to the courts one must look to find
a more inclusive definition of liberty. However, the courts have been
generally reluctant to determine the boundaries specifically:
Although the court has not assumed to define "liberty" with any great precision,
that term is not confined to mere freedom from bodily restraint. Liberty under law
application. It is, simply stated, based upon the notion that there are certain im-
mutuable laws of nature which may not be contravened by any of man's laws. Fur-
ther, it is asserted that these natural laws exist and may be ascertained by some
form of teleological reasoning. For a background of this theory, see the writings
of Edmund Burke and Jacques Maritain and especially MARITAIN, THE RIGHTS OF
MAN AND NATURAL LAW (New York, 1943). For a summary of its current applica-
tion in the law, see Comment, Natural Rights, The Social Compact and Procreation:
A Modern Application of An Abandoned Doctrine, 18 DE PAUL L. REV. 703 (1969).
11. BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 69 (1955).
12. Id. at 71.
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extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue, and it
cannot be restricted except for a proper governmental objective. 13
Similarly, in the case of Meyer v. Nebraska, the United States Supreme
Court said:
While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaran-
teed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included things
have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from
bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of
the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a
home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to those privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. 1 4
Categorically, liberty has been said to include the right to marry whom-
ever one wishes, 15 the right to privacy and intimate marital relationships,' 6
the right to travel, 17 the right to conduct and to attend the school of one's
choice,' 8 the right to teach and to learn foreign languages,' 9 the right to
choose the employment one wishes, 20 the right to contract, 21 and the right
to picket. 22
Obviously then, the term "liberty" is not confined within the bounds
which that term commonly signifies. But does it encompass the freedom
to have with you whomever you wish at an interrogation? Clearly, there
must be other liberties not set forth in the Constitution-nor defined by
the courts-which are nonetheless guaranteed to the people. Rousseau
came to a similar conclusion when he said: "All which an individual
alienates by the social compact is only that part of his power, his property,
and his liberty the use of which is important to the community. ' 23
Therefore, there are inherent liberties which are not expressly enumerated
within the Constitution or its amendments which are guaranteed to the
individual.
13. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954).
14. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). See also Allegeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578,
589 (1897).
15. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
16. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
17. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116 (1958).
18. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
19. Meyer v. Nebraska, supra note 14.
20. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
21. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); Alle-
geyer v. Louisiana, supra note 14.
22. Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937).
23. RoussEAu, supra note 4, at 28.
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In order to determine the extent to which those liberties or rights not
enumerated are guaranteed, it is necessary to look first to the common
law and then to judicial decisions involving the Bill of Rights. The
English common law appears to have recognized that the freedom to pur-
sue a particular course of action was to be permitted unless statutorily
prohibited. For example, in Entick v. Carrington24 the court stated that
there must be some justification to allow a trespass, and that a searcher
is bound to show that some positive law has empowered his actions or
excused his trespass, for otherwise the trespass is not to be allowed.
25
Thus, the early law and writings embodied a belief that an idividual had
certain rights which could not be restrained.
The founders of the Constitution adopted the view expressed in the
English common law. Alexander Hamilton, for instance, stated that
there were certain immunities upon which the government was not granted
the power to intrude. 26 The ninth amendment tends to lend credence to
this contention, as it provides that: "The enumeration within the Con-
stitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people." If there are other rights retained by the
people, it is certainly conceivable that one of these is the right to have a
witness present at an interrogation, for "nothing would be better calculated
to prevent misuse of official power in dealing with a . . . suspect than
the scrutiny of his lawyer or friends or even of disinterested bystanders.
2 7
There have been a multitude of decisions under the Bill of Rights which
have recognized the principle that without express authority by the gov-
ernment, they may not intrude upon a citizen unless in pursuit of an in-
dependent liberty. By surveying some of these decisions, it will become
clear to what extent the individual is free from intrusion. For example,
the fourth amendment grants security against unwarranted searches and
seizures. 28 In addition, it has been recognized that without statutory au-
thorization, wiretapping is an illegal search and seizure in violation of
this amendment. 29
The fifth amendment prohibition against self-incrimination is one of the
most basic rights.3 0  Under it, compulsion in any form is forbidden, and
24. 19 How. St. Tr. 1030 (1765).
25. Id. at 1044.
26. THE FEDERALIST, No. 84 at 578 (Cooke ed. 1961).
27. In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 342, 343 (1957) (Black, J. dissenting).
28. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752 (1969); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Osborn v. United
States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
29. Katz v. United States, supra note 28.
30. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.
609 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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only uncoerced and voluntary testimony has been allowed. Many of the
decisions in this area present facts concerning interrogations and evidence
which were determined to have been ascertained unlawfully. In Massiah
v. United States, for example, the defendant, lulled into a false sense of
security by his co-defendant while in the latter's "bugged" car, made sev-
eral damaging statements. The Supreme Court reversed his conviction,
holding that Massiah should have been allowed to have counsel present
even though he was unaware he was being interrogated. 31
Similarly, in Escobedo v. Illinois32 the confession of Danny Escobedo
was deemed inadmissible because he had been questioned for hours with-
out being informed of his right to remain silent, without being allowed to
see his lawyer, and without being formally indicted. The Court, in re-
versing that once the "adversary system begins to operate . . . the ac-
cused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer"33 because that is
when the government begins to intimidate.
In Miranda v. Arizona3 4 and in the prior decision of Jackson v.
Denno,35 the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of uncoerced
confessions and admissions by witnesses which are therefore more credible.
In an effort to "assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under
the fifth amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incrimi-
nate himself,"36 the Court in Miranda laid down four positive prescrip-
tions, including an absolute right to silence, and to have counsel as soon as
the investigation becomes "accusatorial. ' 37  These prescriptions were
brought closer to home in Mathis v. United States, where they were deemed
to apply to tax investigations.3" In Mathis, the Court expressly "re-
jected the contention that tax investigations are immune from the Miranda
requirements for warnings to be given a person in custody."' 39
Another manifestation of the length and breadth of the individual's
rights is rooted in the sixth amendment, under which a speedy and fair
trial has been guaranteed.40  More importantly, the right to assistance of
31. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
32. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
33. Id. at 492.
34. Supra note 1.
35. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
36. Supra note 1, at 439.
37. Supra note 1, at 436.
38. 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
39. Id. at 4.
40. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S.
213 (1967).
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counsel has been held to mean "effective assistance" 41 beginning long
before the actual trial.42 Similarly, under the eighth amendment, no man
may be deprived of liberty by cruel and unusual punishment. 43
The guarantee of these rights has enabled "the citizen to create a zone of
privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detri-
ment."'4 4  In attempting to invade this "zone," the government, in
addition to denying an accused his right to counsel, has also at times de-
nied him access to relatives or friends. This too has been struck down.
45
In one case, a court phrased it:
Alone or together, neither the unlawful detention for many hours nor the deceit
. . . would suffice to vitiate the confessions as unconstitutionally obtained. But
. . . they kept [the defendant] incommunicado, refusing to allow his lawyer and
friends to consult with him. 4
6
The court concluded that keeping one incommunicado in this manner was
an unconstitutional practice. 47
Would it be too much of a leap from this point to say that the inten-
tional exclusion of a witness-a friend and consultant of the accused-
from an interview conducted by the Internal Revenue Service is also an
"unconstitutional practice?" Perhaps not. As already documented, cases
as far back as Old English law have recognized that of those civil liber-
ties not surrendered to the sovereign, many are expressly enumerated and
many are not. Yet they all have one common denominator-the sanctity
of one's person. For if man is the goal of the state and not its means,
then the sanctity of his person is inviolable without some express authori-
zation.
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law,
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person,
free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law.
4 8
In Tarlowski, the defendant sought to exercise what he believed was a
freedom he possessed. He requested the presence of his accountant dur-
41. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932).
42. Supra note 32; supra note 1.
43. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S.
130 (1878).
44. Griswold v. Connecticut, supra note 16, at 484.
45. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963); Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
322 U.S. 143, 152 n.8 (1944).
46. United States ex rel. Caminito v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698, 700-01 (2d
Cir. 1955).
47. Id. at 700.
48. Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
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ing questioning by the Internal Revenue Service, and this request was
denied. Clearly, Tarlowski was deprived of a liberty within the purview of
the fifth amendment. The freedom of a prospective defendant to have
with him at an interrogation one in whom he reposes trust and confidence
must be included within the rights guaranteed by the term "liberty," if
only for the fact that during an interrogation
[t]he witness has no effective way to challenge his interrogator's testimony as to
what was said and done at the secret inquisition. The officer's version frequently
may reflect an inaccurate understanding of an accused's statements or, on occasion,
may be deliberately distorted or falsified. While the accused may protest against
these misrepresentations his protestations will normally be in vain. . . . But
when the public, or even the suspect's counsel, is present the hazards . . . are
greatly reduced.
The presence of legal counsel or any person who is not an executive officer bent
on enforcing the law provides still another protection to the witness.
49
Previously it was noted that the courts have often been the arbitrators
of what is, or is not liberty; they have laid down the guidelines. Logi-
cally then, it is completely within their power to define any act as within
the liberty covered by the fifth amendment, except those specifically
excluded by the legislature or by a court of higher authority. Therefore,
it must be concluded that it was well within the power of the court in
Tarlowski to expand the term liberty as it did.
If it be conceded that the right to be accompanied by another
in whom one reposes trust and confidence at an interrogation is within the
liberties guaranteed by the fifth amendment, then the next consideration
must be to decide what authority is necessary to deprive one of this liberty.
More precisely, has a special agent of the Internal Revenue Service the
power to exclude others from an interrogation? A priori to a general dis-
cussion of this question, it should be pointed out that a special agent is in
essence a law enforcement officer whose duty is not that of auditing tax
returns but rather of investigating and arresting violators of the fraud
statutes of the Internal Revenue Code.5 0
It has already been seen that whatever liberty is granted by the state
or "discerned" by the courts is subject to limitations. These limitations
stem from three possible authorities: (1) general statutes; (2) the In-
ternal Revenue Code; and (3) the common law. Despite the fact that
limitations on liberty are permitted, they are tolerated only if reason-
49. Supra note 27, at 340-41.
50. United States v. Viale, 312 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1963); See also Hewitt, The
Constitutional Rights of the Taxpayer in a Fraud Investigation, 44 TAXES 660
(1966).
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able; 51 if related to a "proper government objective"; 52 if not arbitrary; 58
and if they do not "sweep unnecessarily broadly . . . the area of pro-
tected freedoms. '5 4 Limitations which exceed these criteria will be, and
have been, struck down. Clearly, a liberty within the bounds of the
fifth amendment may be infringed upon and prohibited if that prohibi-
tion is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable and is directed to a clearly
specific and proper purpose. Unable to locate such a statute, the court
in Tarlowski was forced to conclude that "[n]o statutory authorization
provides the basis for the decision of the Special Agent to exclude the
defendant's accountant from his interview with the defendant." 55
Section 7608 of the Internal Revenue Code grants special agents the
power to search and arrest under a warrant, to issue subpoenas and
summonses, and to seize certain property. Nowhere in the Code is an
agent given the power to exclude whomever he wishes from an interroga-
tion, nor is there any provision specifying that interrogations be con-
ducted with the accused alone.
Absent some express authorization granting exclusion one must look
for an implied sanction. But the search is in vain. It is elementary that
if a right is a claim upon the conduct of other persons, the corresponding
conduct is a duty. Consequently, the duties or limitations placed upon
rights in addition to those expressly imposed correspond to the very lib-
erties already discussed. Put another way, until a right is granted or
defined, its limitations are not defined; ergo there can be no implied au-
thorization to limit the right of an accused to the presence and aid of
another at an interrogation until it is determined to be a right.
The only conclusion that may be reached is that such an invasion of the individual's
right to determine the conditions under which he will deal with agents of the fed-
eral government when under criminal investigation as is present here can be con-
sidered to be nothing less than a denial of liberty without due process of law.
When an agent of the IRS or any administrative body acts on his own authority to
set the limits of an individual's power to associate, this constitutes an invasion of
the liberties guaranteed by the due process clause. 56
Thus, in Tarlowski there evolved a new dimension to the word "liberty."
For the first time, an individual was deemed to possess the right to have
present with him at an interrogation by "the IRS or any administrative
51. Garner v. Bd. of Public Works of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
52. Supra note 13, at 500.
53. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
54. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
55. Tarlowski v. United States, 69-2 USTC 9554, 85,467 (E.D. N.Y. 1969).
56. Id. at 85,467.
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body"57 "friends," "witnesses," "counsel," or "advisors." 58
The decision is important not only because of what it said but also
because of what it did not say. The distinction becomes evident if con-
sidered in conjunction with the definition of liberty. Previously it was
noted that liberty is essentially the absence of opposition to a particular
act and that once government, through the legislature or the courts, de-
clares that a certain act may not be opposed, an individual acquires a
right to perform that act free from interference. The duty of the state
then becomes negative, that is, not to oppose. It is not the state's duty to
implement the particular liberty or even to provide an opportunity to
exercise it.
In Tarlowski, the court makes it permissible for an individual to be
accompanied by whomever he wishes at an interrogation-if it is requested.
But it is not mandatory for the court or the officials involved to supply these
people. In effect, under Tarlowski one cannot be told he may not, for
example, have an accountant present at an interrogation by the Internal
Revenue Service, but by the same token one is not required. The distinc-
tion is relevant only because the court could conceivably have held that
the right to have an accountant or an advisor at an interrogation is a
procedural requirement.
To elucidate the above, in recent years the courts have made certain
rights procedural requirements. As a result, these rights are positive guar-
antees and the state must implement them and must provide the opportu-
nity to exercise them. The relevant cases in this connection are those
concerned with the right to counsel. They are relevant for two reasons:
First, both represent essentially criminal prosecutions; and second, both
invoke a limitation on government by effectively prohibiting involuntary
self-incrimination. Thus, an examination of these cases should provide
the basis for making the right to have an accountant present at an in-
terrogation by the Internal Revenue Service a procedural requirement.
For example, in the early cases, Powell v. Alabama59 and Johnson v.
Zerbst,0 the Supreme Court held that there was a right to counsel as a
matter of due process of law, and that this right meant assistance. The
Escobedo and Miranda cases elaborated on when this right began and
how it was to be implemented. Escobedo held that an accused had a
right to effective assistance of counsel as early as the interrogation. 61
57. Id.
58. id. at 85,462, 85,468.
59. Powell v. Alabama, supra note 41.
60. Johnson v. Zerbst, supra note 41.
61. Supra note 32.
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Miranda then said that an accused had the right to know of these guar-
antees and it was the duty of the law enforcement official to so warn him.6 2
Gideon v. Wainwright represented a further step in the line by its holding
that the right to effective assistance of counsel was required even though the
defendant was indigent and could not afford one.6 3  The gist of these
cases is that due process of law requires that an accused, even before an
interrogation begins and even though he be a pauper, be informed of
his rights, and, if necessary, be supplied with the effective assistance of
counsel.
However, in recent years it has been argued unsuccessfully that in
complicated tax fraud cases, the right to effective assistance of counsel
includes the right to have an accountant. 4 In United States v. Brodson,65
the defendant was prosecuted for filing false and fraudulent tax returns.
The prosecution based its case on the net worth method of computing
tax fraud. 6 Prior to trial, federal tax liens were filed and all of the de-
fendant's assets were tied up. His liquid assets were levied upon so that, in
effect, he became indigent. An attorney was appointed, but Brodson
claimed this was not enough. His argument was that the very nature of
the case called for the services of a trained accountant-which the court
would not appoint. The district court agreed with this contention, stating:
Net worth income tax prosecutions present new, difficult and complex problems.
62. Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 1.
63. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
64. Summers v. United States, 250 F.2d 132 (9th Cir. 1957); United States v.
Brodson, 241 F.2d 107 (7th Cir. 1957); United States v. Wentland, 234 F. Supp.
936 (D.C. Cir. 1964); United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corp., 138 F. Supp. 555
(S.D. N.Y. 1956).
65. United States v. Brodson, 136 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. Wis. 1955).
66. The net worth technique is the most frequently employed of the three
common methods of proving tax evasion: the net worth method; the bank de-
posits method; and the expenditures methods. This was the means first used against
gangsters in the 1930's. See Guzik v. United States, 54 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1931);
Capone v. United States, 51 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1931). One simple way of ex-
pressing the formula involved is: Increase in Net Worth plus Non-Deductible
Expenditures less Non-Taxable Receipts equals the Taxable Net Income. From
there the IRS simply compares their computed Taxable Net Income with what was
actually reported on the return. This technique is extremely beneficial to the gov-
ernment for it shifts the burden of proof to the taxpayer to show how and where he
got the additional monies. Because of this "the defense team is not complete
without the full-time participation of a good accountant." Avakian, Techniques in
the Preparation and Trial of a Fraud Case, N.Y.U. 15TH INSTIT. ON FED. TAX. 1249,
1250 (1957). For a detailed analysis of the net worth method and its implications
see, Avakian, Id.; Duke, Prosecutions for Attempts to Evade Income Tax: A Dis-
cordant View of a Procedural Hybrid, 76 YALE L.J. 1 (1966); and Byer, The Net
Worth Technique for Determining Income, N.Y.U. 13TH INSTIT. ON FED. TAX.
1055 (1955).
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They must be met within the constitutional guarantees. Here, a defense counsel,
assigned by the court and without compensation, no matter how able, is not in a
position to adequately defend without the assistance of an accountant.67
The court thereupon concluded that: "Without the assistance of an ac-
countant the defendant is denied effective assistance of counsel." 68
The appellate court subsequently reversed,6 9 but on the ground that
whether or not Brodson would be deprived of the effective assistance of
counsel must be decided after the fact:
Whether the defendant is correct in his contention that the constitution requires
that one indicted for income tax evasion is entitled to the services of an accountant
to assist his attorney we do not now decide. . . . If there is such a constitutional
requirement at all, a defendant's right to invoke it must depend upon the particular
circumstances of his case. A consideration of the circumstances must neces-
sarily encompass the occurrences at the trial. Of course such occurrences can be
judged only in retrospect. . . . It is illogical for a court to speculate in advance of a
trial on the question of whether a defendant will or will not receive a fair trial
without the assistance of an accountant.7 0
The reasoning of the appellate court is somewhat specious. It is ob-
viously paradoxical to say that an attorney on appeal can show he was inef-
fective by finding the very facts he is claiming he needed expert as-
sistance to uncover. Also, today under the authority of Escobedo and
Miranda, the right to effective assistance of counsel begins at the "ac-
cusatorial" stage. Clearly, if it be conceded that an accountant may be
necessary to effective assistance of counsel in a complicated tax fraud
case, then that right must be available before the trial and conceivably at
an interrogation.
The argument in Brodson was that as a matter of law a procedural re-
quirement existed for the state to provide expert assistance in certain
cases as a requisite of due process. Tarlowski, on the other hand, sought
only the privilege to acquire expert assistance. The distinction is clear.
In the first instance there is a positive duty upon the state to act, and in
the latter, there is a negative duty to refrain from action. Obviously,
Brodson could not have argued along the latter lines as his freedom to
procure an accountant was never impaired-only his financial ability.
Conversely, Tarlowski was not unable to acquire an accountant (he had
one in his permanent employ), but rather he was denied access to one.
Whether Tarlowski could have presented an argument along the lines of
Brodson and won in view of the right-to-counsel cases is unknown. In-
67. Supra note 65, at 164.
68. Supra note 65, at 164.
69. United States v. Brodson, supra note 64.
70. United States v. Brodson, supra note 64, at 109.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
evitably the situation will present itself, and the indications are that the
courts will find it more palatable to provide expert assistance where
necessary as a matter of due process of law. 71
As noted earlier, Tarlowski presents both positive and negatives aspects.
The negative aspects are derived chiefly from what it did not say. The
positive aspects are derived from the fact that Tarlowski defines "liberty"
to include the absolute right to have an advisor present at an interroga-
tion. Making this right absolute raises several implications. Pri-
marily, it means that if, during the course of an interview by a special
agent, a taxpayer demands to have his accountant present, he must be so
permitted. In addition, it would seem that the interrogation must be
halted until the accountant is present. It must be remembered though
that the onus is upon the taxpayer to request his accountant or advisor.
It is only after the request is made that a duty arises to go no further until
the person being interrogated has had an opportunity to secure this help.
Likewise, an audit by a revenue agent could conceivably be construed to
be within the bounds of Tarlowski and, therefore, a request by a taxpayer
for his accountant or attorney would, of necessity, have to be allowed.
Another positive aspect of the decision is that it was not restricted to
investigations by the Internal Revenue Service. The court stated that
"[a] representative of the federal government, [may not] at his own
behest, limit the right of an individual to demand the presence of others
at an interrogation."'7 2 Hence the decision may well extend to any ad-
ministrative body.
One possible application is at Selective Service Board hearings. The
Administrative Procedure Act provides that a person who is compelled to
appear in person before an agency of the federal government is entitled
to be accompanied, represented, and advised by counsel or, if permitted
by the agency, by other qualified representatives. 73  Since the Selective
Service System is an agency of the federal government, it would seem to
be a proper subject of this Act. However, the Military Selective Service
Act of 1967 provides that "all functions performed under this title shall
be excluded from the operation of the Administrative Procedure Act."'7 4
71. In Cornell v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 99, 338 P.2d 447 (1959), it was
held that a lawyer has a right to interview his client in private with psychiatric aid.
Obviously interpreting effective assistance of counsel to include expert advice
they stated that "Itihe basic right involved is not limited simply to meeting be-
tween the client and his counsel. If necessary, third persons may accompany
counsel during his consultations with his client." Id. at 103, 338 P.2d at 449.
72. Supra note 55, at 85,462.
73. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1964).
74. 50 U.S.C. § 436(b) (1964).
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Acting pursuant to this Act, the Selective Service System promulgated a
regulation which provides that "no registrant may be represented before
the local board by anyone acting as an attorney or legal counsel."'75
Most of the decisions have adhered strictly to this rule, basing their
conclusions upon the fact that the board is administrative and investigative
-not prosecutorial-in nature.76 Tarlowski's holding may destroy this
basis and supply the authority for contrary rulings.
Similarly, civil service employees are subject to hiring and firing "for
such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service."' 77 The pro-
cedures utilized are interesting in view of the Tarlowski decision. These
procedures stipulate that an accused employee is entitled to have the
reason for his firing in writing, notice of the action sought against him, a
copy of the charges with affidavits, and a written decision at the earliest
possible date. However, there is the additional stipulation that "[e]x-
amination of witnesses, trial, or hearing is not required but may be pro-
vided in the discretion of the individual directing the removal or suspension
without pay."'7 8  This being the situation, the provision within the
Administrative Procedure Act entitling one to counsel or help before a
hearing by a federal government agency would not apply since here the
employee is not compelled to appear. Nevertheless, the ruling in Tarlow-
ski would seem to fill this void and provide an adequate authority for an
employee to request whatever additional help or counsel he believes he
needs at his hearing.
The additional implications of Tarlowski are numerous, but for present
purposes it should suffice to say that the decision has three general results:
(1) It adds a new and additional facet to the term liberty, reiterating the
pronouncement that liberty means more than freedom from bodily re-
straint; (2) it implies a legal requirement to allow expert assistance, in-
cluding accountants and advisors, at an interrogation and perhaps even
beyond the interrogation stage; and (3) it brings the Internal Revenue
Service and, by implication, many other so-called administrative agencies
of the government, within the purview of the fifth and sixth amendments.
Admittedly, there are unanswered questions: How reasonable must the
request for the presence of another be? May one request the presence of
an accountant who lives in another town or state or country? Must the
75. 32 C.F.R. § 1624.1(b) (1970).
76. United States v. Capson, 347 F.2d 959 (10th Cir. 1965); United States v.
Sturgis, 342 F.2d 328 (3d Cir. 1965); Niznik v. United States, 173 F.2d 328 (6th
Cir. 1949); United States v. Pitt, 144 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1944).
77. 5 U.S.C. § 7501(a) (Supp. IV 1964).
78. 5 U.S.C. § 7501(b) (1964) (emphasis added).
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interrogation be delayed until the advisor arrives? Should the government
advise a potential defendant or even a taxpayer being audited that he
may be accompanied by his accountant or his attorney? The list could
go on. Tarlowski represents but one decision on a continuum, and cer-
tainly these questions will eventually be answered. The importance of
Tarlowski is in its extension of the term "liberty" to a new right for in-
dividuals under our adversary theory of justice. Today a man who is
being interrogated by a representative of the federal government may
request the presence of his attorney, accountant, psychiatrist, or even his
best friend and expect that request to be fulfilled.
Arthur H. Boelter
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-
ABROGATION OF INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY-
AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH
On April 12, 1968, Jacqueline Beaudette was injured while a passenger
in an automobile driven by Garry H. Frana. Miss Beaudette subsequently
filed a complaint alleging that the accident and the resulting injuries to
her person were caused by the negligence of Frana. After the action
commenced, but prior to the entry of judgment, Miss Beaudette and
Mr. Frana were married. The trial court, upon motion by the de-
fendant-husband, entered a summary judgment in his favor based upon
the absolute defense of interspousal immunity.' The Supreme Court of
Minnesota reversed, abrogating the absolute defense of interspousal im-
munity in tort actions. Beaudette v. Frana, - Minn. -, 173 N.W.2d
416 (1969).2
This decision is significant because it represents the most recent effort
by a state court of last resort to dismantle the defense of marital im-
munity-a doctrine which prevents an injured spouse from receiving due
satisfaction for injuries caused by the tortious conduct of the other spouse,
1. See Hovanetz v. Anderson, 276 Minn. 543, 148 N.W.2d 564 (1967); Karalis
v. Karalis, 213 Minn. 31, 4 N.W.2d 632 (1942); Kyle v. Kyle, 210 Minn. 204, 297
N.W. 744 (1941); Patenaude v. Patenaude, 195 Minn. 523, 263 N.W. 546 (1935);
Woltman v. Woltman, 153 Minn. 217, 189 N.W. 1022 (1922); Drake v. Drake,
145 Minn. 388, 177 N.W. 624 (1920); Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427, 107 N.W.
1047 (1906).
2. The case under analysis was consolidated for trial with the case of Green v.
Green, - Minn. -, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969). Since both cases involved sub-
stantially the same facts, the Minnesota Supreme Court made no distinction between
the two and held the same in both.
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